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Humanist cultural identity in Bruni’s Dialogi
When, in the mid and late fifteenth century, Italian humanists looked 
at their history in retrospect, they generally thought of Leonardo Bruni 
(1370 – 1444) as the most representative exponent of early Quattrocento 
humanism.1 Their judgment was not unfounded. Indeed, Bruni had been 
among the first to epitomize fully the qualities that were later to become 
the characteristic features of humanist culture. His lucid and elegant Cice-
ronian Latin was incomparable to that of previous generations. His mas-
tery over the Greek language, which he had acquired as a pupil of Manuel 
Chrysoloras (1355 – 1415), was displayed by his translations from Xenophon, 
Plato, Plutarch, Demosthenes, and Aristotle. His De interpretatione recta set 
a standard for humanist translations, as did his Historiae Florentini populi for 
humanist historiography. 
Bruni also took an active part in the political life of the Floren-
tine Republic, serving as a chancellor from 1410 to 1411 and, again, from 
1427 to his death in 1444. Bruni’s civic engagement influenced most of his 
works. Perhaps for this reason “political interpretations” of Bruni acquired a 
special place in the history of scholarship. Hans Baron and Eugenio Garin 
both looked at Bruni’s works as the keystone of their analyses of what they 
called “civic humanism”; subsequently, J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skin-
ner stressed Bruni’s centrality in the history of republican thought; more 
recently, Bruni’s political persona has guided the inquiries of scholars such 
as James Hankins and Paolo Viti.2
These interpretations have proven essential for understanding 
Bruni’s historical works, orations, and letters. Yet the same cannot be said 
about Bruni’s Dialogi ad Petrum Paulum Histrum (1406).3 This is not to 
say that the cultural stances presented in the Dialogi are devoid of political 
•
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implications: as recently demonstrated by Arthur Field, intellectual and 
political stances were inextricably connected in the cultural environment 
of fifteenth- century Florence.4 However, political interpretations of Bruni’s 
Dialogi risk overshadowing the speculative, “cultural” character of Bruni’s 
project, which was instead perceived by fifteenth- century intellectuals as 
Bruni’s major contribution to the history of humanism. As remarked by Pat-
rick Baker, humanists in the late fifteenth century did not remember Bruni 
for his political efforts, but rather for his translations, Ciceronian Latin, and 
his cultural project generally. In other words, Bruni was perceived as “the 
one who, after nearly a millennium of neglect, restored not classical political 
thought but classical eloquence.”5
In light of this fifteenth- century interpretation of Bruni’s cultural 
inheritance, the main significance of the Dialogi for Quattrocento human-
ism can be seen to derive from the dialogues’ “cultural” rather than “politi-
cal” message. As remarked by scholars such as Riccardo Fubini, Lars Boje 
Mortensen, Carol E. Quillen, and David Quint, the Dialogi is a fundamental 
document of the process that, in the early fifteenth century, led to the defini-
tion of a humanist ideal and cultural identity.6 Yet, Bruni’s Dialogi should 
not be read primarily as the manifesto of a new generation of humanists — 
represented in the Dialogi by Niccolò Niccoli (ca. 1364 – 1437) and Bruni 
himself — who sought to assert the novelty of their cultural program over 
against earlier traditions that were ipso facto labeled as not (wholly) human-
ist.7 Although such a claim is certainly part and parcel of Bruni’s argument, 
it does not reflect the main purpose of the Dialogi. Bruni’s aim was more 
nuanced: he did not seek to portray humanist culture in contrast to earlier 
traditions, but rather to characterize early fifteenth- century humanism as 
a highly variegated movement that encompassed different competing cur-
rents, some of which — according to Bruni — were undesirable. 
While most Bruni scholars have read the Dialogi as documenting 
the shift from a certain Weltanschauung to a different one, I would like 
to suggest that the Dialogi also, perhaps especially, documents the choice 
between two concurrent Weltanschauungen, that is, between two cultural 
alternatives that were still to be debated at the time of the composition of the 
Dialogi. These alternatives, represented by Niccoli and by Bruni respectively, 
involved essential questions concerning the humanist program, for instance, 
its degree of receptiveness to scholastic philosophy, vernacular traditions, 
and non- Ciceronian Latin models. 
The alternatives brought to the fore of the cultural debate by Bruni 
characterize the whole history of humanism rather than solely belonging 
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to a certain generation of humanists. Even when Bruni distances himself 
from the earlier humanist tradition emblematized by Coluccio Salutati 
(1331 – 1406), he does so in order to bring out the different attitudes that 
humanists belonging to his own generation embraced in dealing with medi-
eval and early Renaissance traditions. As it emerges from the Dialogi, the 
relationship between Bruni’s humanism and Salutati’s cultural stances is a 
relationship of partial continuity and critical reconsideration. Bruni clearly 
perceives the generational gap that separates him from his master, but, while 
seeking to distinguish his project from its antecedents, he also recognizes 
Salutati’s lasting influence. That is to say, Bruni advances an inclusivist 
cultural ideology that, for reasons of intellectual or political convenience, 
does not reject precedent traditions outright, but rather tries to revise and 
incorporate them. At the same time, Bruni also distances himself from the 
extremist conception of culture emblematized in the first book of the Dia-
logi by Niccoli, who advocates rejecting the entirety of earlier traditions. I 
thus do not agree with Hankins and Quint, who argue that Bruni was fasci-
nated by Niccoli’s intransigent conception of humanism.8 On the contrary, I 
see Niccoli’s “radical humanism” as emerging from the Dialogi as both intel-
lectually impoverishing and possibly dangerous, since it leaves the whole 
humanist group excessively exposed to criticism from culturally conservative 
factions of Renaissance society. 
As I will demonstrate in the following sections, Bruni’s inclusiv-
ist ideal of humanism clearly emerges from the dynamics that regulate the 
opposition between the main cultural stances portrayed in the Dialogi. The 
analysis of these dialectical oppositions allows us to grasp not only the gen-
eral character of Bruni’s inclusivist ideal but also the precise degree to which 
Bruni was ready to adopt inclusivist attitudes. 
The structure of the Dialogi
In the first book of the Dialogi, the scene opens on the streets of Florence, 
where Bruni, Niccoli, and Roberto de’ Rossi (1355 – 1417) have convened 
in order to pay a visit to their friend and mentor, Coluccio Salutati. After 
greeting his visitors, Salutati exhorts his younger colleagues not to overlook 
the art of discussion (disputatio) in their studies. Salutati is right — Niccoli 
admits — but he and his friends are not to blame for having neglected the ars 
disputandi: the fault is not theirs but of the time they live in (“hac faece tem-
porum”).9 In spite of this preamble, Niccoli proves himself to be a worthy 
disputator, and the remaining part of Book 1 is taken up by a discussion with 
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Salutati on the merits of the Moderns compared to the Ancients. Not only, 
according to Niccoli, should scholastic philosophy be entirely rejected, but 
even the achievements of the three crowns (Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio), 
which Salutati highly praises, ultimately betray a lack of erudition and style. 
Salutati is satisfied by Niccoli’s skills in disputatio, but he strongly 
disagrees with Niccoli’s negative appraisal of the recent literary and philo-
sophical tradition. Yet, as the day is drawing to a close, Salutati must content 
himself with restating his belief that Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio were 
“men endowed with many and excellent talents, worthy of the reputation 
they are universally acknowledged” [homines multis optimisque artibus 
ornatos dignosque eo nomine quod tanto consensu omnium ipsis tributum 
est] (Dialogi, 1.53). 
Book 2 is set on the following day. After a brief eulogy of Florence, 
the discussion goes back to the three crowns. All the injurious things Niccoli 
had said (he confesses) were aimed at eliciting a defense of the three crowns 
from Salutati. But since his plot had not succeeded, Niccoli is ready to make 
amends by defending the three poets himself. What follows sounds like a 
full recantation: Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio are to be praised for their 
exceptional knowledge and for the elegance of their style, so much so that in 
no way they fall short of the Ancients. 
In light of the contrasting attitudes embraced by Niccoli in Book 
1 and Book 2, Hans Baron famously suggested that the two books of the 
Dialogi had been composed at different times, with different purposes. This 
thesis has been rejected by virtually all recent scholars, who have stressed 
instead the unitary and coherent nature of Bruni’s work. Indeed, the appar-
ent contradictions that characterize Niccoli’s stance in Books 1 and 2 are a 
crucial element of the dialectical structure through which Bruni advances 
his argument. More precisely, the seemingly contradictory character of Bru-
ni’s dialogue conforms to the technique of disputatio in utramque partem 
and follows the dialectical model of the Dialogi, that is, Cicero’s De oratore.10 
In contrast to the ideal of the perfect orator outlined by Lucius Licinius 
Crassus in the first book of the De oratore, Marcus Antonius describes the 
perfect orator as a sort of underworkman (“operarium quendam”). In the 
second book, however, Antonius advances a much more moderate position: 
like Niccoli in the Dialogi, he revises the positions taken on the previous day, 
when, he admits, he had tried to confute Crassus in order to steal two of his 
disciples from him.11 
JME502_05Mori_1PP.indd   326 1/29/20   9:28 AM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
Mori / Competing Humanisms 327
Scholasticism in the Dialogi
Instructed by the example of the De oratore, we should be cautious in tak-
ing Niccoli’s contradictory claims at face value. The fact that the fictional 
Niccoli — like the fictional Antonius — ultimately revises the position dis-
played in Book 1 does not imply that such revision should encompass all the 
individual claims advanced on the first day. Indeed, some of the accusations 
made by Niccoli in Book 1 do not undergo any revision. This is the case 
in the attack directed against scholastic philosophy and dialectics, which is 
never recanted in Book 2, hence remaining essentially confirmed through-
out the Dialogi.12
In this regard, Bruni’s stance can be compared to Petrarch’s posi-
tion in De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia. Petrarch’s attack against the 
traditional sources of medieval authority, and especially against scholastic 
philosophy, are clearly echoed in the Dialogi. For instance, Bruni shares 
Petrarch’s typically humanist bias against medieval dialectics, which is criti-
cized in the De ignorantia for its inherently contentious and sophistic char-
acter. As Niccoli tells Salutati in Book 1, prefiguring a central argument of 
Valla’s Repastinatio dialecticae: “[I]s there anything in dialectics, Coluccio, 
that has not been confused by British sophisms [britannicis sophismatibus 
conturbatum]? Is there anything that has not been separated from the old 
and true way of disputing, and turned to absurdities and trifles [ineptias 
levitatesque]?” (Dialogi, 1.25). These flaws are aggravated by the complete 
lack of eloquence that affects all scholastic philosophers. “At present” — one 
reads in the De ignorantia — “the only things they honor in a philosopher are 
babyish and puzzled babbling” [Sic iam sola philosophantis infantia et per-
plexa balbuties . . . in honore est].13 And, similarly, in the Dialogi: “[W]hen 
they speak, [our philosophers] make more mistakes than sentences [plures 
solecismos quam verba faciunt]” (1.20).
The accusations that Niccoli levels at scholastic philosophers belong 
to a standard argument that, inaugurated by Petrarch, was advanced by 
humanists throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The main refer-
ence of these criticisms was to a precise set of nominalist or, more precisely, 
terminist doctrines that spread in the thirteenth- and fourteenth- century 
scholastic environment. However, the humanist polemical tradition dis-
played a marked tendency toward generalization, and antiterminist claims 
soon came to be used as an argument against scholastic culture on the whole. 
In this “general” sense, antischolastic criticism is certainly part and parcel of 
Bruni’s argument, although it constitutes perhaps its least groundbreaking 
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aspect. Like Petrarch some forty years earlier, Bruni too is convinced that 
humanist culture must adopt a new language that, by imitating classical 
Latin, could oppose the abstract verbosity of scholastic philosophers.
Having said that, one has the impression that Bruni takes this aspect 
of his polemic almost for granted, as a well- known and fairly unproblematic 
topos in the humanist discourse. Compared to other points at issue, Nic-
coli’s accusations against scholastic philosophers take up little space in the 
discussion reported by the Dialogi, suggesting that the opposition between 
humanism and scholasticism is not the prime concern of Bruni’s work, as 
was instead the case for Petrarch. Although Bruni does see his cultural enter-
prise as dissimilar from and, in many respects, opposite to medieval and 
scholastic culture, the principal aim of the Dialogi is to discuss a different 
set of cultural assumptions that prevailed in Bruni’s own time. Rather than 
rehearsing Petrarch’s criticism against scholasticism, Bruni intends to dis-
cuss cultural positions that he deems more relevant for the formation of a 
collective humanist identity in the early fifteenth century. More specifically, 
these are the conceptions of humanism portrayed in the Dialogi by Niccoli 
and Salutati respectively. 
Niccolò Niccoli: Fiction and reality
The dialectical structure of the Dialogi is not the only feature that Bruni 
borrowed from the De oratore. As Cicero himself admitted, Crassus and 
especially Antonius were not actually endowed with the vast cultural back-
ground he ascribed to them.14 Notwithstanding, Cicero’s characterization 
of Crassus and Antonius was carried out according to verisimilitude. Anto-
nius, who famously excelled in the inventio and dispositio of the arguments, 
expounded on these canons of rhetoric in the dialogue. Crassus, who was 
instead best known for his stylistic excellence, illustrated the techniques 
related to elocutio and actio.15 By the same token, in characterizing the fic-
tional Niccoli in Book 1, Bruni exaggerates and even distorts some aspects of 
his friend’s cultural positions; however, he does not exceed the boundaries of 
fictional verisimilitude. 
Although Niccoli never wrote anything except perhaps an Ortho-
graphia that has not survived, he played a central role in the development of 
early Quattrocento humanism. Throughout the first quarter of the fifteenth 
century, he maintained a lively correspondence with both Bruni and Pog-
gio Bracciolini (1380 – 1459). Together with Poggio’s, Niccoli’s efforts were 
also of paramount importance for the humanist recovery of classical litera-
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ture. Niccoli commissioned an astounding number of high- quality copies of 
newly found codices and circulated them generously in the humanist milieu, 
as recalled in Poggio’s Oratio in funere Nicolai Nicoli.16 Niccoli’s significance 
for early Quattrocento culture was also recognized by the authors who, in 
the late fifteenth century, tried to outline a retrospective history of Italian 
humanism.17
Due to his relevance in the humanist cultural environment, Niccoli 
was chosen as a fictional character not only by Bruni, but also by Poggio 
in his De nobilitate and the De infelicitate principum. While fictional char-
acterizations of Niccoli reflected his paramount role in early Quattrocento 
humanism, they also contained elements of exaggeration and distortion 
that made the fictional Niccoli — especially in Bruni’s Dialogi — a much less 
nuanced intellectual than he was in reality. However, overdrawn as Bruni’s 
characterization of Niccoli may be, it nonetheless obeys a principle of veri-
similitude, especially with regard to Niccoli’s radical classicism, which was 
well known within the circle of his friends and colleagues. 
As first noted in passing by Baron, all evidence suggests that the 
positions advocated in Book 1 of the Dialogi reflect a set of classicist assump-
tions that were generally ascribed to Niccoli.18 Salutati himself, in an epis-
tolary debate with Poggio over the merits of Petrarch, insinuated that an 
unnamed friend had assisted Poggio in formulating his critique of the poet. 
This unnamed friend — scholars agree — can be no one but Niccoli.19 And, 
indeed, there is overwhelming evidence linking Niccoli to the sort of state-
ments advanced in Book 1. For instance, in a letter to Niccoli, Bruni refers 
to the friend’s complaints about the nullity of the Moderns compared to the 
Ancients.20 Hyperclassicist stances are also attributed to Niccoli by virtually 
all contemporary authors. In his De viris illustribus, Enea Silvio Piccolomini 
writes about Niccoli: “[H]e did not praise any of the living, and amongst the 
dead only four: Plato, Vergil, Jerome, and Horace” [nullum enim viventem 
commendavit, ex mortuis solum quatuor: Platonem, Virgilium, Jeronimum 
et Oratium].21 
Besides, most humanists also agree on another fundamental trait 
of Niccoli’s personality that is reflected in his fictional characterization. 
Even Niccoli’s closest friends admitted that he was uncommonly irascible, 
especially so concerning the issue of comparing the Ancients and the Mod-
erns. The arrogant and uncritical preference for the Ancients imputed to 
Niccoli by Salutati in his letter to Poggio is in keeping with the criticism 
expressed in Book 1 of Bruni’s Dialogi. Introducing his assessment of the 
three crowns, the fictional Niccoli addresses Salutati: “What Dantes . . . are 
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you recalling me? What Petrarchs? What Boccaccios? Do you believe, per-
haps, that I hold the same opinions of the crowd?” [Quos tu mihi Dantes . . . 
commemoras? Quos Petrarchas? Quos Boccatios? An tu putas me vulgi 
opinionibus iudicare?] (1.41). According to the fictional Niccoli of Book 1, 
rather than equaling Vergil, as maintained by Salutati, Dante was entirely 
ignorant and could not write in proper Latin; he was an author suited for 
belt- makers (zonarii) and bakers, but certainly not for the literates (1.42 – 44). 
Petrarch, who was extolled by all Florentines (Niccoli carries on), put forth 
his Africa after great expectation, which turned out to be quite the Horatian 
ridiculus mus — a rather insulting allegation given that Salutati himself had 
so sternly advocated the publication of the Africa in his Metra incitatoria ad 
Africae editionem of 1376.22 To conclude with Boccaccio, who — even Salu-
tati acknowledged — had been surpassed by Dante and Petrarch, according 
to the fictional Niccoli, he is not even worth mentioning (1.49).
The connection established by Bruni between the real Niccoli and 
his fictional counterpart in Book 1 is essential for our understanding of Bru-
ni’s stance. By this means, Bruni intends to signify that the critical position 
presented in Book 1 is not purely abstract or theoretical, as was often the case 
with at least one of the arguments advanced in disputationes in utramque par-
tem. On the contrary, although the real Niccoli was probably less extreme in 
his convictions than his fictional counterpart, criticisms advanced in Book 1 
belong to an actual cultural current that characterized some sections of the 
early Quattrocento humanist environment. As it emerges from its caricature 
in Book 1, this cultural current was inspired by an ideal of extreme classi-
cism that elected few authors as the only acceptable models. Such a cultural 
project left little space for innovation, except for the sake of faithfully restor-
ing the golden age of ancient splendor. Accordingly, the fictional Niccoli of 
Book 1 believes that all cultural stances that differ from the classics should 
be rejected. Most notably, such rejection also encompasses instances of cul-
tural production that are envisaged as adaptations of the classical models 
themselves, as in the case of Petrarch’s Africa. 
Humanism and traditional culture
This cultural perspective did not win the approval of all the humanists 
belonging to Niccoli’s generation. Even a moderate classicist such as Pog-
gio expressed concern about the theoretical consequences of extreme classi-
cism.23 In a letter dated June 4, 1433, for example, Poggio invites Niccoli to 
moderate his indiscriminate contempt for the Moderns and to consider that 
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there were (few) authors who deserve to be admired in the present time as 
well.24 Bruni shared Poggio’s concern. In fact, I would argue that the main 
purpose of the Dialogi was precisely to criticize the extremist cultural posi-
tion that in the humanist circle was espoused by Niccoli, who was hence 
chosen by Bruni in order to advocate in Book 1 an exaggerated and almost 
fanatical version of classicism. 
By pursuing this objective, Bruni also sought to defend his posi-
tion from criticism coming from nonhumanist sectors of Renaissance cul-
ture. More specifically, by orchestrating the dialectical opposition between 
Book 1 and Book 2, Bruni tried to present humanist culture as a variegated 
movement that did not necessarily subscribe to the hyperclassicist positions 
advanced in Book 1, but also encompassed more moderate and inclusive cur-
rents. In all probability, this variegated depiction of humanist culture was 
primarily catered for nonhumanist intellectuals, from whose perspective the 
differences that set apart humanist ideals such as Poggio’s and Niccoli’s were 
all but evident. 
Bruni’s target audience belonged to a traditionalist current that 
was still very relevant in early Renaissance culture and society. It is difficult 
to define with precision “traditional culture,” but some of its salient traits 
included a general sympathy for late scholastic philosophy and especially for 
terminism; a great admiration for the three crowns; a keen interest in vernac-
ular literature; and a suspicious attitude toward pagan antiquity.25 Besides, 
as stressed by Field, “many of the traditionalists built bridges of their own, 
connecting their culture not only to the great non- Humanists Dante and 
Boccaccio but also to Petrarch, Coluccio Salutati, and even Leonardo Bruni, 
as well as to minor figures such as Luigi Marsili (1342 – 1394) and Roberto 
de’ Rossi.”26 For example, Marsili and Salutati were among the authors 
praised in Giovanni Gherardi da Prato’s Paradiso degli Alberti along with late 
scholastic philosophers such as Biagio Pelacani (ca. 1350/54 – 1416) and expo-
nents of traditional culture such as Francesco Landini (ca. 1335 – 1397).27 
In brief, the cultural inclinations shared by traditionalists were very 
different from the humanist ideal but not necessarily opposite to it. Tradi-
tionalists did not take issue with the humanist interest in classical eloquence, 
nor did they object to the “constructive” elements of the humanist cultural 
project. They were offended, however, by those who flaunted a generalized 
contempt for all Moderns, advocating “destructive,” hyperclassicist stances. 
In responding to these provocations, traditionalists were not interested in 
determining whether “destructive” stances were espoused by all the human-
ists belonging to Bruni’s generation or just by some of them. They were 
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sure, however, that Niccoli fully embodied what they considered as the most 
offensive intellectual attitude. 
Accordingly, Niccoli and the culture he represented was attacked 
by foremost exponents of the “traditional culture” such as the Gherardi 
da Prato, Cino Rinuccini (ca. 1350 – 1417), and Domenico da Prato (ca. 
1389 – 1433) in several invectives and literary works.28 Domenico da Prato, 
for instance, accused Niccoli for stating that “Dante’s book should be given 
to apothecaries to make packets or to grocers to wrap salted fish” [il libro di 
Dante esser da dare alli speziali per farne cartocci, o vero più tosto alli piz-
zicagnoli per porvi dentro il pesce salato].29 The accusation was leveled at 
the real Niccoli, but it was clearly in keeping with the claims contained in 
Book 1 of the Dialogi, where the fictional Niccoli affirms that Dante’s works 
should be saved for “belt- makers, bakers and that sort of people” [zonariis, 
pistoribus atque eiusmodi turbae] (1.44). 
The convergence of the attacks leveled by traditionalists against the 
real Niccoli on the one hand and the extremist positions adopted by the 
fictional Niccoli in Book 1 on the other allows us to understand what could 
have been one of the objectives pursued by Bruni in orchestrating the dia-
lectical oppositions that characterize the Dialogi. By having Niccoli recant 
the extreme stances of Book 1, Bruni was differentiating his ideal of culture 
from the most extreme flavors of humanism. In doing so, he also shielded 
the newborn humanist movement from the attack of traditional sectors of 
Renaissance culture. By demonstrating that not all humanists subscribed 
to hyperclassicist theses such as those advanced in Book 1, Bruni implicitly 
demonstrates that the traditional sectors of Renaissance culture had no rea-
son to oppose humanism in general. 
A similar interpretation has been advanced in passing by Field, who 
suggests that “Bruni was attempting to portray, through Niccoli, an ideolog-
ical position on moderns that Bruni himself was clearly identified with and 
from which he now wanted to distance himself.”30 Field cites in support of 
his claim a passage in Book 1, where Salutati states that Bruni would rather 
be wrong with Niccoli than right with him.31 This implies, according to 
Field, that, around 1404, Bruni was perceived as a “Niccolian”: a perception 
he intended to correct in the Dialogi. I largely agree with this interpretation, 
although I believe that Bruni’s aim emerges from the dialectical structure of 
the Dialogi as a whole rather than from individual passages. For instance, 
an alternative reading of the statement cited by Field could refer to the fact 
that Bruni’s cultural project belonged to a new generation of humanists, 
including Niccoli, that as a group had distanced themselves from earlier 
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humanist conceptions such as Salutati’s. Be that as it may, Bruni would have 
had strong reasons to insist on distinguishing between different humanist 
conceptions in his own time, and in particular between an extremist “Nic-
colian” position and a moderate stance that was not utterly incompatible 
with traditional culture. 
On the one hand, the Dialogi thus suggests that humanists belong-
ing to Bruni’s generation were united in the desire to distinguish themselves 
from some medieval traditions, such as scholastic philosophy and dialectics. 
On the other hand, Bruni aims to describe the burgeoning humanist culture 
as a variegated movement whose members disagreed on how precisely to dis-
tinguish themselves from their predecessors. Humanism, as it emerges from 
the Dialogi, could not be entirely equated with Niccoli’s extremist positions, 
which had caused most of the antihumanist bias.
Toward an inclusivist conception of humanism
By portraying humanism as a variegated intellectual movement and by 
shielding his own stance from the attacks of the traditional currents of 
Renaissance culture, Bruni had achieved one of his objectives. A further 
aim of the Dialogi was targeted to Bruni’s fellow humanists and concerned 
the very ideal of humanism. Bruni was not merely trying to avoid the pos-
sibility of criticism; he was also, and perhaps especially, proposing an ideal 
of humanism that could be taken as an alternative to Niccoli’s intransigent 
classicism. More precisely, his was a notion of humanism that, unlike Nic-
coli’s, was open to incorporating traditions that, although different from 
those of the classics, could be revised instead of being rejected outright. 
In order to support his ideal of culture, Bruni attacked the extremist 
humanist current emblematized by the fictional Niccoli in Book 1 in three 
different ways: implicitly, in Book 1; explicitly, in other works; and implicitly 
again, in Book 2, by having Niccoli recant the statements advanced in Book 
1. Implicit criticism in Book 1 has been addressed by many Bruni scholars. 
Mortensen, for instance, proposes that “on the author’s level,” the debate 
staged in Book 1 between Niccoli and Salutati is over before it begins. In 
Mortensen’s terms: 
[T]he claims of Niccoli have . . . been invalidated by the author 
of the dialogue in two ways. 1) The debate was occasioned by 
silence. . . . The author thus implicitly tells us that Niccoli cham-
pions a lost cause. . . . 2) The obvious Ciceronian form and style 
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of the dialogue indicates in itself that Niccoli’s condemnation of 
the “moderns” must be revised; if the “moderns” were unable to 
write, the author would have silenced himself.32 
What is more, implicit criticism emerges from the very style of Niccoli’s 
speech in Book 1. Niccoli’s harangue against the three crowns is largely 
centered upon statements that are not only excessive but also sophistic. 
This seems to be implied by Salutati’s ironic praise of Niccoli, who is com-
mended in Book 1 for having talked subtilissime — a quality that was com-
monly used by scholastic philosophers to describe a good disputatio, and, as 
such, generally carried negative connotations for Bruni.33
The caricatured nature of Niccoli’s claims in Book 1 suggests that 
Bruni did not feel any sympathy for them. On the contrary, he sought 
to exaggerate and vulgarize for polemical purposes the positions held by 
extreme classicists. I thus differ from scholars such as Quint, according to 
whom “the evidence of the Dialogues suggests a younger Bruni fascinated by 
a Niccoli who, from his position of privilege, inveighs against not only past 
humanist tradition but the very idea of a humanist Renaissance.” I also dis-
agree with Quint’s suggestion that “simply by virtue of the fact that he does 
the bulk of the talking in the Dialogues, Niccoli becomes their central char-
acter and ‘hero.’ ”34 As I read it, the very fact that Niccoli does the bulk of the 
talking is an indication of how urgent it was for Bruni to oppose a cultural 
strand that he considered dangerous for “the very idea of a humanist Renais-
sance.” In other words, Niccoli is the central character of the Dialogi pre-
cisely because the cultural attitude he represents is the main object of Bruni’s 
criticism. Such criticism is expressed by having Niccoli expound his beliefs 
in a grotesque way (Book 1), and then by punishing him with an obligation 
to recant that certainly was not in character with the real Niccoli (Book 2). 
Indeed, rather than the “hero” of the Dialogi, Niccoli is really their victim. 
This does not mean, of course, that Bruni aimed to antagonize or 
offend the real Niccoli. Clearly the Dialogi does not follow the rhetorical 
model of the invectiva (all too familiar to humanist authors). On the con-
trary, the Dialogi reflects a sincere intellectual debate among friends and, 
more specifically, among the members of the humanist group that had 
formed around the elder Salutati. In spite of their intellectual (and political) 
differences, Bruni and Niccoli remained close friends for more than a decade 
following the publication of the Dialogi.35 Their amicable and respectful 
relationship throughout the 1410s is attested by Bruni’s dedication of his 
Vita Ciceronis to Niccoli, along with the many letters addressed to the friend 
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in the first books of Bruni’s epistolary.36 The relationship between Bruni 
and Niccoli started to deteriorate, however, in the period around 1419.37 The 
growing ill feelings between the two caused Bruni’s criticism of Niccoli’s 
cultural stances to become explicit and to extend to all aspects of Niccoli’s 
life, as was customary in humanist polemics. 
In 1424, Bruni openly attacked Niccoli with a ferocious invective, 
the Oratio in nebulonem maledicum.38 The biting tone of the Oratio cannot 
be compared to the dispassionate criticism advanced in the Dialogi, yet the 
nature of the accusations leveled at Niccoli in the Oratio is in line with the 
points made by Bruni almost two decades earlier. In the Oratio, the main 
vice that Bruni imputes to Niccoli, stultissimus homo, is a “mixture of pride 
and malevolence” [vanitas malignitate coniuncta]. This, according to Bruni, 
is the very root of Niccoli’s innata dementia, the origin of the “thousand 
ridiculous things that he had said and done” [mille illius facta dictaque ridic-
ula] (340). An example of such ridiculous affectation is provided by Bruni 
in a sarcastic sketch of Niccoli, who is portrayed walking in the streets of 
Florence with an air of self- conceited superiority “as if he was saying: ‘Look 
at me and recognize my incredibly deep knowledge: I am the pillar of letters, 
the arch of science, the norm of doctrine and wisdom’ ” [quasi “Videte me,” 
inquiat, “ac meam sapientiam profundissimam nescitote: ego sum columen 
litterarum, ego scientie archa, ego doctrine ac sapientie norma”] (340). Nic-
coli’s affectation, Bruni continues, was made even more offensive by his arro-
gant attitude toward everyone else: “if the passersby do not pay attention to 
him, he swells in rage and takes on complaining about the worthlessness of 
the present times, in which letters and studies are held of no value” [quod si 
forte non attendant obvii, continuo intumescit queriturque ignaviam seculi, 
quod litteras et studia flocci pendat] (340). 
According to Bruni’s Oratio, Niccoli’s stultitia and vanitas have 
gone so far that he has come to look askance at everyone without excep-
tion. He believes that he can achieve fame by damaging the reputation of 
all great men (342). For this reason, Niccoli never ceases inveighing against 
Dante, a “great and noble poet,” but also against Petrarch and Boccaccio, 
not to mention Aquinas (342). The same treatment is meted out to all great 
men, living and dead, except those who had died “a thousand years in the 
past” (344). It is almost too easy for Bruni to take the final stab at Niccoli: 
“if Petrarch himself, who is the author of so many excellent literary monu-
ments, was ignorant, how ignorant should we consider you, who could never 
put together even two words in Latin?” [si Petrarcha ipse ignorans fuit, cuius 
tot preclara extant monumenta litterarum, in quanta te ignorantia versari 
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existimandum est, qui numquam vel duo simul verba latine coniungere 
scrivisti?] (346). 
While this type of criticism, such as the attack implicitly leveled 
against the fictional Niccoli in Book 1, is mainly destructive in character, 
Bruni reserved constructive criticism for Book 2. In the second book of his 
Dialogi, Bruni does not pass direct judgment on Niccoli’s positions, whose 
implicit rejection results from the very fact that Niccoli is forced to recant. 
Rather, Bruni focuses in Book 2 on advancing an ideal of humanism that he 
sees as an alternative to the path taken by Niccoli. 
If the positions advanced in Book 2 thus belong to Bruni’s cultural 
project, it is clear why Niccoli should not sound too sincere in his recanta-
tion. Niccoli’s lack of sincerity is not only natural but also belongs to a rhe-
torical reversal whose irony could not have escaped the members of Bruni’s 
entourage. All those who knew Niccoli also knew that the panegyric of the 
three crowns delivered in Book 2 was not only at odds with Niccoli’s actual 
convictions but also with his personality. One can imagine, in fact, that it 
would have been impossible for Bruni or Poggio to prevail upon Niccoli to 
relinquish his extremist views. However, the literary fiction of the Dialogi 
allows Bruni to claim his victory. As the author of Book 2, Bruni can pun-
ish the fictional Niccoli for his statements, forcing him — who was, in real-
ity, the least amenable of all people — to submissively abjure his convictions, 
embracing instead a cultural project that was much closer to Bruni’s. In 
these terms, the lack of conviction on Niccoli’s part is not an indication of 
Bruni’s insincerity or hesitation, as suggested by Quint.39 On the contrary, 
it is the ironic device adopted by Bruni to signal his fictional victory over 
Niccoli.
Coluccio Salutati in the Dialogi
The moderate, inclusivist ideal of humanism that Bruni contrasts with the 
extremist stances emblematized by the fictional Niccoli is illustrated in the 
Dialogi by Bruni’s treatment of Salutati’s cultural positions. Compared to 
most humanists in Bruni’s generation, Salutati was much more sympathetic 
to characteristic features of medieval culture such as scholastic commentar-
ies, vernacular poetry, etymological investigations, and allegoresis.40 In Ron-
ald Witt’s terms, Salutati did not “embrace Petrarch’s notion of the ‘Dark 
Ages.’ For him, the centuries intervening between antiquity and the present 
had been more like an arctic summer evening, with the thirteenth century as 
the brief night before the rising sun with Mussato and Geri.”41 
JME502_05Mori_1PP.indd   336 1/29/20   9:28 AM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
Mori / Competing Humanisms 337
Bruni’s inclusivist ideal of humanism was much more critical than 
Salutati’s toward medieval culture. In this regard, the difference between 
Salutati’s and Bruni’s cultural projects surfaces on more than one occasion 
in the Dialogi. This is the case, for instance, of Salutati’s appraisal of the 
ars disputandi. Following his master, the Augustinian friar Luigi Marsili, 
Salutati highly praised disputation, which he considered one of the three 
areas of learning appropriate for Christian eloquence, along with preaching 
(predicare) and teaching (docere).42 As a fictional character, Salutati admon-
ishes his younger colleagues to practice the art of discussion, as he himself 
had done (Dialogi, 1.7). In order to convince Bruni and his friends, Salutati 
commemorates Marsili, whom, as a young scholar, he frequently visited to 
discuss the most diverse topics (1.11 – 12). Salutati’s peroration is successful 
and apparently convinces Niccoli, who agrees with the elder friend: “You 
are right, Coluccio. I trust that one could hardly find something that may 
benefit our studies more than discussion [disputatio]. Nor have I heard this 
only from you, but also many times from Luigi [Marsili], whose commemo-
ration of yours has almost moved me to tears” (1.14). Yet, as remarked by 
Fubini, Niccoli’s submissiveness is merely apparent.43 And, although he pro-
vides an example of disputatio by discussing the merits of the Moderns, or 
the lack thereof, he does so after implicitly undermining Salutati’s notion of 
disputatio. 
Discussion, Niccoli admits, is a greatly rewarding exercise for those 
who can count upon solid knowledge and reliable sources. However, the 
decay of all disciplines and the lack of books have affected modern culture 
so deeply that, due to their ignorance, disputatores cannot but appear inept 
(Dialogi, 1.15 – 16). In other words, according to Niccoli, throughout the 
period stretching from the Middle Ages to the present, the basic require-
ments for disputatio had not been met and, as a result, rather than practicing 
the ars disputandi, modern philosophers indulged in “vain garrulity” [gar-
rulitas vana] (1.16). Niccoli does not go so far as to openly attack Salutati on 
this point, but neither does he revise his appraisal of the ars disputandi in 
Book 2. Altogether, the implicit meaning of Niccoli’s statements is clear: as 
conceived by Salutati and, before him, by Marsili, the notion of disputatio 
belongs to modern culture (or lack thereof) and as such is to be considered 
little more than sophistry.
This passage on the ars disputandi is quite revealing of Bruni’s atti-
tude toward Salutati and, more generally, of his inclusivist ideal of human-
ism. On the one hand, without coming into overt conflict with the elder 
humanist, thanks to Niccoli’s words, Bruni distances himself from the cul-
JME502_05Mori_1PP.indd   337 1/29/20   9:28 AM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
338 Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies / 50.2 / 2020
tural stance represented by Salutati and, more generally, from the environ-
ment of the Santo Spirito convent, to which Marsili belonged. On the other 
hand, Bruni revises Salutati’s position rather than rejecting it outright.44 In 
fact, Niccoli’s disputatio in utramque partem, which extends throughout the 
whole Dialogi, suggests that the cultural renaissance driven by the human-
ists could also bring forth a renaissance of the ars disputandi. In its humanist 
flavor, however, as conceived by Bruni, disputation can no longer follow the 
medieval models that Salutati refers to. Rather, it needs to revive classical 
rhetorical models, such as Cicero’s De oratore.
Another aspect of Salutati’s thought that partially distinguished his 
cultural stances from Bruni’s is the appraisal of Petrarch, who is commended 
by Niccoli in Book 2 of the Dialogi. As in the case of the ars disputandi, 
here too, Bruni seems to accept Salutati’s position; yet, on closer inspection, 
he only accepts a deeply revised and radically new version of it. In order to 
appreciate the novelty of Bruni’s approach, one needs to consider Salutati’s 
assessment of Petrarch’s virtues. Toward the close of the fourteenth century, 
Petrarch’s literary and philosophical merits were a popular topic among the 
Florentine intellectual elite.45 Marsili was a great admirer of Petrarch, and 
Salutati himself extolled the works of the poet on many occasions.46 
A first, cursory praise of Petrarch is contained in an early letter from 
Salutati to Francesco Nelli da Empoli.47 Some years later, in 1379, Salu-
tati wrote to Giovanni Bartolomei expressing his concern over his friend’s 
uncertainty about whether Petrarch should be preferred over Homer, Hes-
iod, Theocritus, Vergil, Demosthenes, Cicero, Varro, and Seneca. Accord-
ing to Salutati, even the greatest of the Ancients, Vergil and Cicero, did not 
compare with Petrarch, who surpassed the former in both poetry and prose, 
and equaled the latter in prose while surpassing him in poetry.48 Besides, 
according to Salutati, Petrarch was not only a great poet but also a great 
philosopher. Most importantly, however, unlike the Ancients, Petrarch was 
a Christian. In fact, he was the model of the Christian philosopher, who 
brings together his love for the classics with the love for Christ.49 
Such a tendency to stress Petrarch’s Christianity and to cite it as an 
argument for his superiority over the Ancients became more pronounced in 
the last years of Salutati’s life.50 Until the end of the 1360s, Salutati’s defense 
of pagan classics had conformed to the markedly secular humanist tradi-
tion that, before Petrarch, had been inaugurated by authors such as Lovato 
Lovati (1240/41 – 1309) and Albertino Mussato (1261 – 1329). Christian 
motives, however, started to intensify in Salutati’s writings as soon as the 
early 1370s. This process reached its peak in 1405 – 6, when Salutati defended 
JME502_05Mori_1PP.indd   338 1/29/20   9:28 AM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
Mori / Competing Humanisms 339
a Petrarchan notion of Christian humanism against the attacks leveled at the 
studia humanitatis by Giovanni da San Miniato (1360 – 1428) and Giovanni 
Dominici (1355/56 – 1419).51 
In the same years — the last of his life — Salutati also exchanged with 
Poggio a few heated letters concerning, among other things, the appraisal 
of Petrarch’s intellectual heritage. Only the letters by Salutati are extant 
and — it has been convincingly argued — they can be regarded as one of Bru-
ni’s sources for the composition of the Dialogi.52 The notion of Petrarch as a 
model of Christian virtue lies at the heart of Salutati’s argument. In writing 
to Poggio, Salutati confirms his assessment of the works by Petrarch and 
insists on the poet’s Christianity as the conclusive proof of his superiority 
over the whole lot of the gentiles. The main virtues that can be praised in an 
author are two, Salutati affirms: sapientia and eloquentia. And, with regard 
to sapientia, not only Petrarch, but even “a less than ordinarily learned man 
of our times” surpasses the Ancients, who were not enlightened by the 
knowledge of the Christian faith.53 In terms of eloquentia, the style of the 
Ancients was often more elegant than that of modern theologians, but it 
was ultimately deceitful since its purpose was to cover the ignorance of the 
Ancients. Salutati hence agreed with Petrarch: since words and things are 
the subject matter of eloquentia, one cannot be truly eloquent unless he has 
achieved a true (i.e., Christian) understanding of things.54
Salutati’s insistence on Christianity and doctrinal orthodoxy as a 
criterion of philosophical and literary excellence was not simply due to his 
religious convictions. As stressed by Witt, Salutati found an authoritative 
precedent for this kind of argument in Petrarch himself and, specifically, in 
the De ignorantia. Distancing himself from the scholastic tradition, Petrarch 
accused medieval philosophers of being learned “not in the law of Moses or 
Christ, but in that of Aristotle” [non mosaica utique nec cristiana, sed aris-
totelica . . . in lege].55 Completely submissive to the authority of Aristotle, 
scholastic philosophers had not realized that, wise as he was, Aristotle was 
only a man, and not only that but was also a gentile. Therefore, although he 
discussed happiness at length in the Ethics, he was so ignorant of the real, 
Christian happiness that “any devout old woman, or any faithful fisherman, 
shepherd, or peasant, [quelibet anus pia, vel piscator pastorve fidelis, vel agri-
cola] is happier, if not more subtle, in recognizing it.”56
These statements are relevant not only because they provided Salu-
tati with a model to follow in his apology for Petrarch, but also because they 
characterized a specific conception of Christian humanism to which both 
Petrarch and Salutati subscribed, at variance with the humanists belong-
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ing to Bruni’s generation.57 In this regard, it is significant that Niccoli’s 
recantation in Book 2 should be devoid of all religious arguments for the 
superiority of Petrarch over the Ancients, siding with Salutati instead on 
the excellence of Petrarch both in poetry and prose (2.82). 
A similar attitude characterizes Niccoli’s eulogy of the other two 
crowns of Florence as well. Dante is praised for the sapientia and eloquen-
tia displayed by his descriptions of the heavenly motions, by his arithmeti-
cal computations, and especially by his verses “in which he described love, 
hatred, fear, and the other passions of the soul” [in quibus amorem, odioum, 
formidinem ceterasque animi perturbationes exprimit] (Dialogi, 2.73). By 
the same token, in Book 2, Niccoli commends Boccaccio for his learning, 
eloquence, elegance, and ingenii praestantiam, namely, the virtues that he 
perceives in Boccaccio’s genealogy of the gods, topological descriptions, and 
historical and mythological biographies (2.87). 
The encomium of the three crowns pronounced by Niccoli in Book 
2 can be compared to Bruni’s Vite di Dante e Petrarca, composed in 1436 
during Bruni’s chancellorship. Bruni at that time had stronger political rea-
sons to praise the three Tuscan poets than he did in 1406; however, the 
core arguments that Bruni advances in the Vite are almost identical to those 
presented in Book 2 of the Dialogi.58 Most importantly, however, neither the 
Vite nor Book 2 contain any reference to Petrarch or to Dante’s Christianity 
as an argument for their superiority over the Ancients. 
Bruni’s cultural project
As exemplified by Bruni’s treatment of Salutati’s cultural positions, the 
dialectical structure of the Dialogi is subservient to an inclusivist ideal of 
humanism that also inspires Niccoli’s recantation in Book 2. Yet, we should 
not automatically equate Bruni’s cultural project with the positions advanced 
in Book 2. These positions are integral to Bruni’s ideal of humanism, but 
they do not suffice to provide a complete picture of it. Bruni advances his 
ideal of humanist culture by carefully orchestrating the relationship between 
Book 1 and Book 2. Analysis of the Dialogi as a whole, then, should lead us 
to a more nuanced, sophisticated understanding of Bruni’s cultural project. 
Granted that Niccoli’s intransigent classicism and Bruni’s ideal of 
humanism are the main positions discussed in the Dialogi, one should not 
forget that Bruni also takes into consideration two further cultural stances, 
namely, the scholastic tradition and the early humanist culture emblema-
tized by Salutati. In these terms, we can read Book 1 as containing (1) an 
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explicit criticism of scholastic culture (advanced by Niccoli and never taken 
back); (2) an implicit revision of Salutati’s cultural assumptions, which are 
accepted once rid of some of their original elements, such as the insistence 
on Christianity as a standard of literary and philosophical excellence; and (3) 
an implicit rejection of Niccoli’s cultural stance. The resulting conception of 
humanism proposed by Bruni entails all these conclusions. It markedly dif-
fers from Niccoli’s exclusivist stances, but it incorporates Niccoli’s criticism 
of scholasticism. Most importantly, however, Bruni’s ideal of culture, unlike 
Niccoli’s, does not indiscriminately reject all positions that do not fully con-
form to it. On the contrary, Bruni is open to views such as Salutati’s, views 
that, although not conforming perfectly to his cultural project, can be par-
tially revised and eventually adopted. 
Bruni advances this moderate and inclusivist cultural program both 
in the Dialogi and in other works. For example, Gary Ianziti has recently 
demonstrated that Bruni’s historical writings reflect a variety of historio-
graphical models that Bruni never embraces in toto, but rather reworks into 
a new style of humanist history.59 This inclusivist approach to sources is 
also reflected by Bruni’s De studiis et litteris, written in the 1420s. In this 
long open letter, Bruni addresses Battista Malatesta, the wife of the Lord 
of Pesaro, commending her for her scholarly virtues. These virtues, Bruni 
writes, have driven him to pen his thoughts on topics that a woman should 
explore. First of all, she should attain a wide and exhaustive familiarity with 
many authors. Such knowledge should not be confined to a few canonical 
books, in the style of modern theologians.60 On the contrary, her eruditio 
should embrace all the best authors, in all fields, from antiquity to the pres-
ent. For example, in the field of theology, she should read Lactantius, Augus-
tine, Jerome, Ambrose, Cyprian, Gregory of Nazianzus, John Chrysostom, 
and Basil of Caesarea. Besides, she should also read modern theologians, 
even though she should mainly follow the example of the Ancients.61 In 
brief, while Niccoli’s cultural stance presupposed a careful selection of the 
best classics, faithful adherence to their model, and rejection of all the rest, 
Bruni’s advice to Battista reads as an encouragement to discerningly expand 
one’s cultural horizons. To excel in culture, one should read all authors and 
discriminate between the good and the bad in each of them. One should be 
able to learn from the Ancients and to take what is good from the Moderns. 
This inclusivist conception of culture and learning was supported 
by some weighty authorities, including Basil of Caesarea, whose Address to 
the Youth Bruni had translated into Latin in 1400 – 1401.62 In this letter to 
the young, Basil insists that pagan knowledge is “not without usefulness for 
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the soul,” as demonstrated by Moses and Daniel, who were trained among 
the Egyptians and the Babylonians before they turned to the study of the 
true God.63 The method that resulted from Basil’s suggestion is extremely 
similar to that advised by Bruni in his De studiis. More precisely, it is a 
method that, without rejecting any tradition on principle, relies on the read-
ers’ judgment to distinguish the good from the bad in all sources. In Basil’s 
terms, Christian students should approach pagan literature in the way bees 
approach flowers: by choosing the best alone and by taking only what they 
need from them.64
The moderate and inclusivist conception of culture emblematized 
by Basil and advised by Bruni can be regarded, I believe, as Bruni’s most 
important legacy for the history of humanism. Throughout the fifteenth 
century, a moderate ideal of humanism comparable to Bruni’s coexisted 
with an extremist one that closely resembled Niccoli’s. The cultural opposi-
tion represented in the Dialogi can thus be analyzed not only in the context 
of Bruni’s works but also a posteriori, from the perspective of the humanist 
debates that throughout the fifteenth century opposed a “Brunian” concep-
tion of humanism to a “Niccolian” one.65 In light of this, we can better 
understand the place occupied by Bruni’s Dialogi ad Petrum Paulum His-
trum in the intellectual history of humanism. 
Bruni’s work documents the development of the humanists’ aware-
ness not only of their own cultural identity as a group but also of the diver-
gences that set apart different cultural positions within the humanist group. 
The significance of the Dialogi owes not only to its role in distinguishing 
the humanist current from earlier or nonhumanist traditions. The Dialogi’s 
importance also and especially owes to Bruni’s realization of the need to 
choose between two concurrent alternatives that concerned the humanist 
cultural project in general and specifically its degree of receptiveness to other 
traditions. 
•
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